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Battle	of	the	mandate:	Defining	the	dispute	over	a	new
Scottish	independence	referendum
The	ongoing	dispute	over	whether	a	new	Scottish	independence	referendum	should	take	place
reflects	very	different	interpretations	of	Scotland’s	sovereignty,	writes	Anthony	Salamone.	Questions
of	whether	Westminster	or	Holyrood	can	determine	if	a	new	referendum	is	held	are	distinct	from	the
issue	of	independence	itself,	and	will	most	likely	continue	to	be	contested	at	least	until	after	the	next
Scottish	parliamentary	elections.
Independence	is	the	predominant	issue	of	Scottish	politics,	with	a	significant	amount	of	business	at	Holyrood
filtered	to	some	degree	through	its	prism.	Even	the	most	consequential	matter	of	the	day	–	Brexit	–	has	become
more	a	proxy	for	ongoing	arguments	over	Scotland’s	constitutional	future	than	an	impetus	for	substantive	reflection
on	its	relationship	with	the	rest	of	Europe.
While	Scotland’s	opposition	to	leaving	the	EU	has	been	clear	and	consistent,	Brexit	has	been	instrumentalised	as	a
centrepiece	in	Scottish	discourse	on	power	and	autonomy.	Nevertheless,	Brexit	has	transformed	the	independence
debate	by	raising	the	serious	prospect	of	a	further	referendum	much	sooner	than	otherwise	would	have	been
expected.	Brexit	has	also	ensured	that	the	outlook	for	Scottish	independence	is	completely	changed	from	2014.
The	UK’s	pursuit	of	departure	from	the	EU	contrasts	sharply	with	Scotland’s	likely	application	for	EU	membership
under	an	independence	scenario.	This	substantial	divergence	creates	new	questions	–	particularly	about	Scotland’s
path	to	EU	accession	as	a	third	country	and	the	potentially	harder	border	between	Scotland	and	England	–	which
have	only	begun	to	be	meaningfully	discussed.
First	Minister	Nicola	Sturgeon	has	stated	her	intention	to	hold	a	referendum	by	the	end	of	this	year.	Last	month,	she
made	a	formal	request	to	the	Prime	Minister	for	the	powers	to	hold	a	legally	valid	plebiscite.	Alongside	the	request,
she	published	Scotland’s	Right	to	Choose:	Putting	Scotland’s	Future	in	Scotland’s	Hands,	the	Scottish
government’s	written	case	for	holding	a	new	vote.	Its	tenets	include	the	UK’s	withdrawal	from	the	EU	against
Scotland’s	democratic	will,	the	current	pro-independence	majority	of	the	Scottish	Parliament	and	Scotland	returning
an	overwhelming	majority	of	seats	for	the	Scottish	National	Party	(SNP)	at	the	recent	UK	general	election.
Boris	Johnson	has	responded	with	a	one-page	letter	rejecting	a	new	referendum,	without	any	great	detail.	Even	if
the	UK	government	were	to	agree,	at	this	stage	it	would	be	logistically	challenging	to	organise	a	deliberative
referendum	for	2020.
Separate	to	the	arguments	over	whether	Scotland	should	become	independent,	the	debate	on	whether	an
independence	referendum	should	be	held	reflects	strongly	dissonant	interpretations	of	the	United	Kingdom	as	a
state,	the	functioning	of	its	constitution	and	the	locus	of	democratic	authority.	Scotland’s	recent	precedent	of	holding
the	2014	independence	referendum	has,	perhaps	unsurprisingly,	formed	a	cornerstone	of	the	present	debate.	The
Scottish	government	has	consistently	sought	to	replicate	the	same	major	steps	as	before:	the	devolution	of	power
to	hold	a	referendum,	a	formal	agreement	with	the	UK	government	on	its	conduct	and	outcome,	and	the	delegation
of	its	main	parameters	to	the	Scottish	Parliament	(instead	of	the	UK	level).
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First	Minister	of	Scotland,	Nicola	Sturgeon.	Credit:	Scottish	Government	/	(CC	BY-NC	2.0)
In	light	of	the	current	disagreement	over	holding	a	new	referendum,	this	precedent	poses	a	salient	question	–	why
did	the	2014	referendum	happen?	In	one	explanation,	the	SNP	won	an	outright	majority	at	the	2011	Holyrood
election	(the	first	time	a	party	had	done	so)	on	a	headline	manifesto	commitment	to	hold	an	independence
referendum.	The	UK	government	facilitated	the	necessary	processes	to	make	the	prospective	referendum	legal,	in
a	straightforward	implementation	of	the	democratic	will	of	the	people	of	Scotland.	Scottish	institutions	ultimately
undertook	the	referendum.
In	another	explanation,	the	UK	government	decided,	in	view	of	the	SNP’s	majority	victory	at	that	election,	to	agree
with	the	Scottish	government	that	an	independence	referendum	should	take	place.	Since	the	constitution	is	a
reserved	matter,	the	UK	government	undertook	that	determination	at	its	sole	discretion	as	the	ultimate	guardian	of
Scotland’s	interests,	with	the	UK	the	state	and	Scotland	a	component	part.
These	two	competing	interpretations	of	the	basis	for	the	2014	independence	referendum	are	underpinned	by
markedly	different	logics.	The	first	interpretation	implies	that	sovereignty	rests	with	the	people	of	Scotland	and	it
supports	the	premise	that	the	UK	is	a	multinational	state,	not	a	nation	itself.	The	second	interpretation	suggests	that
sovereignty	instead	rests	with	UK	institutions	(the	UK	Parliament,	UK	government,	the	Crown-in-Parliament)	and	it
presupposes	that	the	UK	is	a	single	nation	in	which	the	powers	of	sub-state	entities	like	Scotland	are	permanently
delimited	unless	the	central	institutions	decide	otherwise.
These	conflicting	points	of	view	lead	to	alternative	definitions	of	what	constitutes	a	mandate	for	an	independence
referendum.	Under	the	Scottish	sovereignty	approach,	the	people	of	Scotland	decide	through	elections	whether	a
referendum	should	take	place.	While	Scottish	or	UK	elections	could	be	relevant,	the	status	of	the	Scottish
Parliament	as	the	national	legislature	of	Scotland	makes	it	the	logical	venue	for	such	determinations.	In	short,	a
majority	in	the	Scottish	Parliament	in	favour	of	holding	an	independence	referendum	represents	a	mandate	for	one
to	take	place.
Under	the	UK	sovereignty	approach,	the	UK	government	decides	both	whether	a	referendum	should
happen	and	what	measures	it	chooses	to	apply	to	make	that	decision.	These	could	include	the	results	of	elections
in	Scotland,	opinion	poll	evidence	on	support	for	independence	and	separately	for	a	referendum,	the	amount	of	time
since	the	last	referendum,	and	the	positioning	of	civil	society,	business	and	popular	movements.	The	mandate
derives	from	the	UK	government’s	central	interpretative	authority	of	Scotland’s	interests	and	its	executive	powers	of
the	state.
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The	chasm	between	these	two	perspectives	is	wide	–	and	it	is	difficult	to	imagine	how	it	might	be	bridged.	Reflective
considerations	of	democracy	and	sovereignty	were	obviated	in	2011	by	the	UK	government’s	expeditious
decision	not	to	obstruct	the	Scottish	government’s	efforts	to	deliver	a	referendum.	By	contrast,	since	the	EU
referendum	the	Scottish	government	has	made	two	formal	requests	for	referendum	powers	(in	March	2017	and
December	2019),	neither	of	which	has	been	successful	to	date.	No	obvious	solution	presents	itself	in	the	case	of
such	disagreement	between	the	Scottish	and	UK	levels.
The	Scottish	government	will	only	proceed	with	a	valid	and	recognised	referendum.	Legal	recourse	has	never	been
attempted,	but	it	could	prove	perilous	for	the	independence	movement	if	the	courts	decided	in	favour	of	UK
institutions.	The	UK’s	evolutive	constitution	provides	no	mechanisms	to	resolve	this	kind	of	dispute	–	except
perhaps	to	theoretically	assert	UK	parliamentary	sovereignty.
Yet	the	UK	government	cannot	escape	the	precedent	of	the	2014	referendum,	which	was	an	exercise	in	popular
sovereignty.	Viewed	in	that	way,	the	vote	was	not	simply	a	decision	by	the	people	that	Scotland	should	not	become
independent,	but	their	affirmation	that	Scotland	should	remain	part	of	the	UK.	It	follows	that	popular	consent	on
Scotland’s	participation	in	the	UK	could	be	revoked	in	future.
The	best	way	forward	lies	in	separating	views	on	independence	from	criteria	for	a	referendum.	Those	criteria	would
have	to	be	agreed	by	both	the	Scottish	and	UK	levels.	A	third	party,	such	as	the	Electoral	Commission,	could	be
appointed	to	make	determinations	on	whether	they	had	been	met.	Making	the	calling	of	an	independence
referendum	procedural	rather	than	political	would	place	the	focus	on	satisfying	the	criteria	instead	of	contesting
their	definition.
This	debate	will	persist	until	either	a	referendum	is	agreed	or	the	next	Holyrood	election	scheduled	for	May	2021
takes	place.	After	the	election,	the	calculus	will	shift	depending	on	the	results,	how	the	new	Scottish	government
proceeds	and	how	the	UK	government	responds.	London	should	not	assume	that	views	in	Scotland	on
independence	and	a	mandate	for	a	referendum	align.	If	a	consensus	emerges	in	Scottish	politics	after	the	next
election	in	favour	of	a	new	independence	referendum	(separate	from	views	on	independence	itself),	the	UK
government	might	find	that	unity	hard	to	ignore.	It	is	perfectly	possible	–	indeed,	likely	–	that	a	new	referendum	is
eventually	agreed	while	leaving	the	issue	of	competing	interpretations	of	sovereignty	completely	unaddressed.
Nevertheless,	that	question	will	linger	for	the	UK	–	regardless	of	Scotland’s	constitutional	future.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	originally	appeared	at	our	sister	site,	Democratic	Audit.	It	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the
position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the	London	School	of	Economics.
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